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Abstract
The request of the Internet users enjoying privacy during their e-activities enforces the Internet society to
develop techniques which offer privacy to the Internet users, known as Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs).
Among the Internet users, there are attackers who desire more than anything else to enjoy privacy during their
malicious actions, and a PET is what they were looking for. Thus, although a PET should offer privacy to the
internet users, proper techniques should also be employed in order to help the victims during the investigation
procedure and unveil the identification of the attackers. The paper summarizes the current design issues of PETs
and introduces additional issues in order to offer forensic investigation services. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first attempt which it proves (the obvious) that the existing PETs do not meet accountability
requirements. By knowing explicitly the reasons the PETs are inefficient offering accountability, it is the most
appropriate way to make PETs offering higher level of accountability without decreasing the level of the privacy
offered.
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INTRODUCTION
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.” (Article 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Internet users are humans who desire to use this
right in the Internet community as well. The technology responsible to offer privacy to the Internet users is
called Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET). Despite the large range of PETs (Gritzalis, 2004; Anonymizer,
2004; Reiter and Rubin, 1998; Dingledine et al, 2004; Shields and Neil Levine, 2000; Golle and Juels, 2004; Ulf
et al, 2003; Rennhard and Plattner, 2004), none of them has been designed in such a way to offer forensic
investigation techniques, in order to discourage potential attackers to use the PET as a shield of privacy
protection.
The section 2 describes the PET framework and three PETs; section 3 summarizes the current design criteria for
a PET; section 4 proposes additional design criteria that every PET should follow in order to offer forensic
investigation techniques; section 5 concludes the paper giving directions for future research.

PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES
The PETs have one or more privacy enhancing entities (PEE) participated in forwarding the messages from the
user to the Server and backward. The Server can identify the sender of the message based on the IP Address of
that message. However, the message received by the Server has the IP Address of the last PEE, because the PEE
replaced the IP Address of the sender with his/her IP Address before forwarding it to the Server. By following
this technique, the PET achieves to hide the identification of the user from the Server. From the large list of
available PETs (offering communication anonymity), there is below a description of three of them, the
Anonymizer (Anonymizer, 2003), the TOR (Dingledine et al, 2004) and the Crowds (Reiter and Rubin, 1998).
These PETs have been selected because their characteristics represent the majority of PETs’ characteristics.

Anonymizer
The Anonymizer (figure 1) uses a single intermediate node, which is responsible to forward the requests (like a
proxy server) to the appropriate entity. The Anonymizer supports only http requests.

Figure 1 Anonymizer
In the example (figure 2) the Client A communicates with Amazon, the Client B communicates with Yahoo and
the Client C communicates with Ups.
The three Servers cannot determine the original sender of the requests, because the requests have passed through
the Anonymizer and the Anonymizer has already altered information from layer 4 and below (including the
source IP Address). However, a global eavesdropper can link the sender with the receiver of the packets.

Figure 2 Example of an Anonymizer
Tor - The updated version of Onion Routing
The client, before sending the real message, exchanges secret keys with some privacy enhancing entities (OR1,
OR2 and OR3). After the client has exchanged the keys of the necessary entities, it encrypts the message with
the key of the last entity. Then the encrypted message is encrypted again with the key of the previouslast entity.
This procedure continues until the encrypted message is encrypted with the key of the first entity. Then, the
client sends the encrypted message to the first entity, which decrypts the message, and it sends the message to
the next entity, until the message reaches the last entity. The last entity decrypts the encrypted message and then
the clear message is sent to the original server as shown in figure 3

Figure 3 TOR protocol
Crowds
The philosophy of the structure and the actions of the Crowds is based on the fact that the more hosts (called
“jondo”) are participating in the forwarding process of a request, a higher level of anonymity (Pfitzmann and
Hansen, 2006) is achieved. Each participant of the Crowds executes a process on his/her computer, which is
called “jondo”. Each jondo is responsible to forward requests coming from another jondo. When a new jondo is
created (and added to the framework), it makes its identity public. The packet passes through a number of jondos
before reaching the final destination. Each jondo selects randomly the next jondo. Once a virtual path is created,
the jondo uses the same path for future connections. After 24 hours jondo discards the current path and creates a
new one.
The (Luis von et al, 2006) describes a principle of transforming almost every PET to offer message traceability.
The (Golle, 2004) introduces 3 protocols which offer reputability in mix networks. The (Antoniou et al, 2006)
and (Antoniou and Gritzalis, 2006) introduce a new protocol called RPINA (Respect Private Information Not
Abuser) which can embed any PET and offer network forensics functionality to the Server as far as the
anonymous user does not perform any malicious action against the Server. Although the importance of the
above papers, none of them define the necessary functionalities that a PET should offer in order to achieve
message traceability.

CURRENT PET’S ISSUES
This section describes how the PET protocols approach the issues below, which are currently under PETs’
consideration. The PET should be able to:
a.

forward the message to the Server as quickly as possible

An Anonymous User (AU) wants to enjoy the anonymity offered by the PET without sacrificing the performance
of the communication. However, the use of cryptography, which is used by the most PETs, reduces the
communication’s performance.
TOR offers a circuitbased communication. Before a user sends information to a Server, a circuit must be
created. During the creation of the circuit, a user uses asynchronous encryption which is a timeconsuming
procedure. After the circuit is created, the user uses symmetric encryption, which is faster. In order to avoid the
delay of the creation of a circuit, a user can use an existed circuit for more than one communication session.
However, the extended use of the same circuit means that the participated entities use the same secret keys to
encrypt more messages, which increases the possibility of an eavesdropper to find out the secret key. It is also

important the fact that the user is responsible to select the Onion Routers that will participate in the circuit;
therefore, the user may balance the level of the privacy with the level of performance (the more Onion Routers
are participated, the higher level of privacy and the lower level of performance is achieved)
In the Crowds, each jondo is responsible to decide whether to send the message to the destination server or to
forward it to another jondo; thus, it decreases the flexibility of the user in order to control the level of privacy
and the level of performance. Moreover, during the creation of the path, there is a delay due to the user needs, in
order to get a list of the available jondos with their secret keys from the Blender.
The singleproxy PETs, like the Anonymizer, offer the limited possible delay, because the lack of encryption
avoids delay of forwarding messages.
b. resist against outsider attackers
An attacker, who is not one of the privacy enhancing entities, is called an outsider attacker. A potential attacker
may select a number of ways to attack and link the identification of the sender (user) with the receiver (server).
The PET is responsible to resist, by confusing an outsider attacker, who tries to intrude the system. In (Argyrakis
et al, 2003) there is a complete analysis of those attacks (Passive attack, Active attack, Trace Back Attack,
Eavesdroppers, Message Attack, Timing attacks, Flooding attacks, Connection periods attacks and Cookies).
Without any encryption, the Anonymizer is not capable to offer high level of protection to a client against traffic
analysers, or trace back attacker and other kind of attacks. They are also vulnerable from a global eavesdropper
(an eavesdropper who has the ability to eavesdrop all the communications).
The TOR offers confidentiality between the user and the last privacy enhancing entity. An eavesdropper can only
access the plain message during the communication of the last PEE (Privacy Enhancing Entity) and the Server.
However, the attacker will not be able to link/match the plain message with the original sender of the message.
The TOR offers padding (a technique which adds dump data in order to create a fixsize message) to the
messages, which protects against the traceback attack as well as the passive attack. Also, the multiple layers of
the encrypted message are an additional level of offering defence against those attacks.
The padding technique sacrifices the performance of the protocol because it sends dummy data. The dummy
data not only travel from one node to another overloading the network, but it must also be encrypted and
decrypted, which is a timeintensive procedure.
The Crowds, like the TOR, has an efficient level of protection against outsider attacks. However, both PETs are
vulnerable against time analysis attack.
c.

resist against insider attackers

The potential attacker is one of the privacy enhancing entities. The PET is responsible to protect the privacy of
the user against compromised nodes (Malicious Collaborators  Argyrakis et al, 2003)
The TOR has a very efficient way to protect against an attack from inside. Even if one of the PEE participated in
a circuit is honest, the attackers cannot join the sender’s identity with the receiver’s identity.
The Crowds has less efficient techniques, than the TOR, to resist against insider attackers because all the
participated PEE in a path have access to the forwarded plain message, whereas in TOR, only the last entity has
access to the plain message.
The Anonymizer is a singleproxy PET; therefore, there is no insider attacker other than the same singleproxy
PEE itself.
d. offer fault tolerant to the privacy of the message
In a PET environment with several privacy enhancing entities (PEE), it is usual for an entity to stop functioning
while forwarding a message. In such an event, the PET should have a recovery mechanism.

The TOR has no recovery method after a PEE stops functioning. The tcp protocol will be responsible to inform
the user of a timeout delay.
The case with the Crowds, is similar to this, where the unlinkability (Pfitzmann and Hansen, 2006) offered by
the PET has a result to lack of fault tolerant techniques.
The Anonymizer as a singleproxy PET, could not be able to offer a fault tolerant mechanism.
e.

serve as many Internet services as possible

For a user, it is not acceptable to use a different PET for each Internet service. Therefore, a PET should support
as many protocols as possible (i.e. Telnet, Ftp, Http, Https, IRC, and Email). However, some PETs have been
designed to offer specific Internet services to the client (i.e. Web Services).
The TOR supports all the services which run over TCP protocol.
The Crowds and the Anonymizer support only limited protocols of the 7th OSI Layer, including the HTTP
protocol.
f.

be adapted easily

A user, who wants to use a PET without the need of modifying the existed system infrastructure or Operating
System, is more likely to use it. The distribution of software which should offer integrity is not an easy task. In
case a user executes software, it is a risky procedure, especially when the integrity of that software is not
guaranteed. The software may be a Trojan horse or a Virus.
A user, who wants to use the TOR, requires executing software at his/her computer. Although the program does
not need administrator’s privileges, it may be harmful. The same issue appears in the Crowds, where a user
executes the software (called jondo).
In the case of Anonymizer, what is required to be performed is just to configure the Browser to support this PET.
This is actually its biggest strength among the other issues.
g.

be acceptable for the sender (client) and the receiver (Server)

A PET, which is acceptable neither from clients nor from Servers, is quite a useless technology. The services and
functionalities of a PET must respect the participated entities (client and Server).
In a TOR environment, the user gives authority to the last PEE of the circuit to have access to the plain message.
On the other side, a Server knows that in case of a malicious action of an anonymous user, no mechanism exists
to unveil the identification of that user.

FORENSIC INVESTIGATION ISSUES
It is interesting to study the behaviour of the PETs in a case where an abuser uses the PETs to attack, and what
techniques are employed to guarantee abuser’s identity. In a scenario where an attacker uses a PET to hide
his/her identity, the victimserver requests from that PET to help with the investigation. The malicious message
has the identification of the PET; therefore, there is a possibility for the message to have been originally sent by
the PET and not from an Internet user. Thus, the PET should be accused if PET does not provide evidence
proving the involvement of another entity (Internet user) in that malicious action.
A proper PET should offer not only privacy to the user but also forensic investigation techniques to the Server.
During a forensic investigation, there is a need to consider the below questions that a PET should be able to
answer.
a.

Can a PET know that a message was sent by itself?

After a Server detects a malicious message coming from a PET, it requests from that PET the identification of
the user. The Server, also, sends the message received by the PET. How can the PET be sure that the message has

been sent by itself? A precondition to answer this question is that the message should be linked with the PET.
One technique to link the PET with a message is that the PET signs the message before sending it to the Server.
Therefore, if the Server sends the signed message to the PET, the PET cannot deny that the message was sent by
itself.
If the message is encrypted with the Public Key of the Server, the PET cannot sign the unencrypted message, but
the encrypted message. The below scenario describes the way that the PET proceeds with the investigation while
the message is encrypted with the public key of the Server.
The AU sends a message encrypted with the public key of the Server
AU  PET: encryptedMessage
The PET signs the encrypted message and forwards it to the server.
PET  Server: sign{encryptedMessage}
The Server detects that the message is malicious and sends both the encrypted and the decrypted messages back
to the PET.
Server  PET: sign{encryptedMessage}, plainMessage
There is an issue. The PET has signed only the encrypted message, not the plain message. How can the PET
know that the plain message has been sent by that PET?
Although the PET knows that it has sent the encryptedMessage to the Server, it needs to prove that the
plainMessage is the decrypted message of the encryptedMessage.
The PET encrypts the plainMessage with the public key of the Server.
x=encrypt(plainMessage, Server’s Public Key)
If the x is equal to the encryptedMessage, then the unencrypted message of the encryptedMessage is the
plainMessage; therefore, the PET knows that the plainMessage has been forwarded by itself, without any
signature on this specific message.
The PET has an alternative option to determine if the message was sent by itself or even sent without any
signature. The PET can generate the digest message of each message and store it for future use. However, the
PET will need to have large store media to store all this information. In case the PET wants to verify that a
message was sent by itself, the PET can generate the digest message of that message and compare it with the
stored digest messages. The PET can determine if the message was sent by itself, however it can deny this fact.
Although none of the current PETs sign the message before sending it to the Server, this functionality can be
embedded in the future, without reducing the level of the PETs’ offered privacy. In addition to this, none of the
PETs store the forwarded messages. Thus, the PETs have lack of techniques for identifying the messages that
they forward.
b. Can a PET decide if a packet is malicious or not?
The PET must adopt a mechanism capable to detect whether a message is malicious or not. In order to
accomplish that, the message must be decrypted.
The current PETs do not attempt to offer forensics investigation services; therefore, none of the PETs has
employed such a mechanism. Furthermore, the incorporation of this service in the PETs does not lead to privacy
violation or any other kind of threat.
c.

Can a PET identify the sender (Anonymous User) of a message?

The PET must be sure that the message has been originally sent by a specific user even after the communication
session has been completed. Without the prior authentication of the user, it is not possible to be sure about the

originality of the message. The authentication can be achieved with several ways. For instance, one way is that
the AU can sign the message before sending it to the PET. In that case, the PET must remove the signature of the
AU and forwards only the unsigned message to the Server, in order to hide the AU’s identification.
Another way for the AU to be authenticated by the PET is that the AU can send a login/password with the
message to the PET. However, a prior registration procedure must be applied.
The TOR protocol has a buildin authentication technique, even without the use of a digital signature. The first
privacy enhancing entity (PEE) in the circuit can be sure about the identity of the AU. However, a victimServer
cannot contact directly that PEE requesting the identity of the AU, but from the last PEE of the circuit. The last
PEE must request information from the previous PEE, until the request reaches the first PEE. Thus, a broken
PEE results in breaking the chain between the first PEE and the last PEE of the circuit, consequently, the identity
of the attacker remains unknown.
The Crowds protocol authenticates (login/password technique) the AU through the Blender before commencing
sending information. Although the authentication procedure, takes place, it does not link the exchanged
messages with the identity of the actual sender (AU). Therefore, the originality of a message cannot be identified
or traced.
The Anonymizer does not offer any technique to identify the sender (AU) of a message.
d. Can a PET identify the sender of a message even with a compromised intermediate PEE?
In the case of a singleproxy PET, a compromised PEE leads to catastrophic results, not only for the forensic
investigation procedure but also for the privacy violation of all the users using that PET.
In the case of the Mixnetworks, like TOR and Crowds, where they offer unlinkability, all their privacy
enhancing entities participated in a circuit/path must cooperate to reveal the identification of the abuser. Even if
one of the privacy enhancing entities has been compromised, is not possible to identify the abuser because each
PEE knows only its successor and predecessor PEE of the specific circuit. Each PEE is a link in a chain which
links an AU with a Server. Even if one link stops functioning, the chain breaks, consequently no link between an
AU and a Server exists.
However, if a PET does not offer strong unlinkability (including data anonymity), there is a way to find out the
identification of a user, even with an intermediate compromised PEE. The only condition is that the PEE
(PEE_entry) that has direct communication with the AU, as well as the PEE (PEE_exit) that has direct
communication with the Server are not compromised. The PEE_exit may ask all the PEE if they know the origin
of the specific message. The PEE_entry may respond with the identification of the user.
In case of TOR, only the latest PEE (PEE_exit) of the circuit knows the plain message, whereas in Crowds, the
weakest data anonymity is provided, due to the reason that all the participated PEE of the path, have access to
the plain message.
e.

Can a PET present evidence to the Server regarding the involvement of a user?

The Server does not only need to know the identification of the abuser but also needs evidence about the PET’s
claims. Possibly, the PET desires to protect the abuser, and instead of the abuser’s identification, the PET reveals
the identification of an innocent user.
Appropriate evidence requires a strong relationship between the user’s identity and the malicious message. An
appropriate way to link the message with the user is the use of the digital signature. The AU must sign the
message before sending it to the PET and the PET must store the signed message for future use in case of an
attack. However, the PET must remove the signature of the AU before forwarding the message to the Server
because the Server can identify the AU from that signature.
Such a technique has practical problems as the large volume of gathered information is a significant issue.
Beyond this issue, each exchanged message will demand more cputime to be proceeded. The current PETs do

nothing for gathering evidence since they have not been designed to offer such services to the Server but to the
user.
f.

Can a PET guarantee the Server that the PET will co-operate in the investigation?

The Server knows that the PET has the responsibility to cooperate only in a case that the PET will not be able to
refuse that the message was sent by that PET. If the PET signs the message before sending it to the Server, the
Server can be sure that the PET cannot refuse this action.
As it has already been mentioned in [a], none of the current PETs sign the message before sending it to the
Server; therefore a PET can refuse that a message has been forwarded through it.
The table 1 summarizes the level that the PETs approach the issues

ANONMIZER

CROWD

TOR

Table 1 Forensic services offering by the PETs

Can a PET know that a message
NO
NO
NO
was sent by itself?
Can a PET decide if a packet is
NO
NO
NO
malicious or not?
Can a PET identify the sender
M
L
L
(Anonymous User) of a message?
Can a PET identify the sender of
NO
L
N/A
a message even with a
compromised intermediate PEE?
Can a PET provide evidence to
NO
NO
NO
the Server about the involvement
of a user?
Can a PET provide a guarantee to NO
NO
NO
the Server that the PET will cooperate in the investigation?
Level of achievement:
H= high
M=medium L=low NO= not offered
N/A=not applicable

CONCLUSION
Based on the current PETs’ design considerations, it is an issue the fact that the PETs offer privacy to the users
without any design consideration to discourage attackers to attack through PETs. Thus, PETs’ design goal should
also include/suggest a proper way to prevent the potential attackers to use maliciously these technologies.
The lack of advanced authentication techniques and nonrepudiation actions of the client gives the potential
attackers the opportunity to use the PETs and take advantage of these technologies. Besides, an Internet user
should have privacy as far as he/she does not violate the rights of others. If, at the end of the day, we (internet
society) have the perfect PET based on the current criteria, which does not prevent or discourage an attacker to
attack through this technology, we will have bigger problems to solve, like the eanarchy.
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